Abstract -Wireless sensor networks pose new security and privacy challenges. One of the important challenges is how to bootstrap secure communications among nodes. Several key management schemes have been proposed. However, they either cannot offer strong resilience against node capture attacks, or requires too much memory for achieving the desired connectivity. In this paper, we propose a LOcation dependent Connectivity guarantee Key management scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks (LOCK) without using deployment knowledge. In our scheme, a target field is divided into hexagon clusters using a new clustering scheme crafted out of nodes's heterogeneity. Even without using deployment knowledge, we drastically reduce the number of keys to be stored at each node. A pair-wise, group wise and cluster key can be generated efficiently for among nodes. LOCK provides dynamicity by two ways; one by not completely depending upon pre deployed information and other by not completely depending upon location. Compared with existing schemes, our scheme achieves a higher connectivity with a much lower memory requirement. It also outperforms other schemes in terms of resilience against node capture and node replication attacks. Scheme is proved to support largest possible network using smallest storage overhead as compared to existing key management schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are commonly used in ubiquitous and pervasive applications such as military, homeland security, health-care, and industry automation. WSNs consist of numerous small, low-cost, independent sensor nodes, which have limited computing and energy resources. Secure and scalable WSN applications require efficient key distribution and key management mechanisms.
These systems have traditionally been composed of a large number of homogeneous nodes with extreme resource constraints. This combination of austere capabilities and physical exposure make security in sensor networks an extremely difficult problem. Because traditional asymmetric encryption is not practical in this environment, a number of clever symmetric-key management schemes have been introduced. One well received solution that has been extended by several researchers is to pre-distribute a certain number of randomly selected keys in each of the nodes throughout the network [9] , [4] , [7] , [16] . Using this approach, one can achieve a known probability of connectivity within a network. These previous efforts have assumed a deployment of homogeneous nodes and have therefore suggested a balanced distribution of random keys to each of the nodes to achieve security. Likewise, the analysis of those solutions relies on assumptions specific to a homogeneous environment. A deviation from the homogeneous system model has been increasingly discussed in the research community. Instead of assuming that sensor networks are comprised entirely of low-ability nodes, a number of authors have started exploring the idea of deploying a heterogeneous mix of platforms and harnessing the available "microservers" for a variety of needs. For example, Mhatre et al. [1] automatically designate nodes with greater inherent capabilities and energy as cluster heads in order to maximize network lifetime. Traynor et al. [32] extend this idea to mobile groups by having a more powerful node perform group handoffs for neighboring sensors.
In this paper, we propose LOCK without using deployment knowledge. In our scheme, a target field is divided into hexagon clusters using a new clustering scheme crafted out of nodes's heterogeneity. Even without using deployment knowledge, we drastically reduce the number of keys to be stored at each node. A pair-wise, group wise and cluster key can be generated efficiently for among nodes. LOCK provides dynamicity by two ways; one by not completely depending upon pre deployed information and other by not completely depending upon location. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II and Section III discusses clustering approach. In section IV LOCK has been the proposed network's model, network deployment and discussed with section V discussing performance related issues. Finally concluded in section VI.
II. NETWORK ELEMENTS
Basically, two architectures are available for wireless networks, distributed flat architecture and hierarchical architecture. The former has better survivability since it does not have a single point of failure, and the latter provides simpler network management, and can help further reduce transmissions. As we know, WSNs are distributed event-driven systems that differ from traditional wireless networks in several ways such as extremely large network size, severe energy constraints, redundant low-rate data, and many-to-one flows. It is clear that in many sensing applications, connectivity between all Sensor Nodes ( SNs ) is not required but some applications require explicit connectivity between every pair of nodes. Mostly wireless SNs merely observe and transmit data to those nodes with better routing and processing capabilities, and do not share data among themselves. Data centric mechanisms should be performed to aggregate redundant data in order to reduce the energy consumption and traffic load in WSNs (out of scope of our proposal). Therefore, the hierarchical heterogeneous network model has more operational advantages than the flat homogeneous model for WSNs with their inherent limitations on power and processing capabilities [11] [12] [13] [8] [12] . Moreover recent trend is towards secure connectivity between geographical neighboring nodes. This phenomenon requires of Group Key which is shared symmetric key among a group of neighboring nodes.
In this paper, we focus on large-scale WSNs with the same three-tier hierarchical architecture as in [2] [3] . SNs are divided into two categories namely H-Sensors and L-Sensors. H-Sensors are small number of SNs possessing higher memory, transmission range, multiple transmission ranges, processing power and battery life. Our network model has four different kinds of wireless devices on the basis of functionality; sink node/base station ( BS ), cluster head node ( CH ), Anchor Nodes ( AN ) and sensor node ( SNs ).
Sensor node ( SNs ): Sensor nodes are L-Sensors which are inexpensive, limited-capability, generic wireless devices. Each SNs has limited battery power, memory size, data processing capability and short radio transmission range. SNs communicates with its, CH , SNs and SINK .
Cluster head node ( CH ): Cluster head nodes are a kind of H-Sensors, have considerably more resources than the SNs . Equipped with high power batteries, large memory storages, powerful antenna and data processing capacities, CH can execute relatively complicated numerical operations and have much longer radio transmission range than SNs . CHs can communicate with each other directly and relay data between its cluster members and the sink node (base station). SNs which need to communicate with neighbors in neighboring cluster will relay its data through CHs .
Anchor Nodes ( ANs ): Anchor Nodes are a kind of H-Sensors which have multiple power level for transmission. Thus ANs have capability to transmit in multiple ranges which can be changed at requirement. ANs are placed at triangular/Hexagonal points to realize a new clustering approach. We introduce a new clustering approach which divides the nodes into clusters of hexagonal shapes. This approach will classify our scheme into location dependent scheme but without using deployment knowledge.
Sink node/Base station ( SINK / BS ): Sink node is the most powerful node in a WSN, it has virtually unlimited computational and communication power, unlimited memory storage capacity, and very large radio transmission range which can reach all the SNs in a WSN. Sink node can be located either in the center or at a corner of the network based on the application.
In our network model, a large number of SNs are randomly distributed in an area. A sink node/base station ( BS ) is located in a well-protected place and takes charge of the whole network's operation. After the deployment, CHs partition a WSN into several distinct clusters by using a clustering algorithm discussed ahead.
Each cluster is composed of a CH and a set of SNs 
III. NETWORK DEPLOYMENT AND CLUSTERING APPROACH
SNs are large in number and have limited capabilities. SNs are deployed randomly in the field for deployment like can be dropped from an aircraft. ANs are placed uniformly and in controlled manner using a manned or unmanned deployment vehicle which is equipped with GPS system to connect with satellite to retrieve exact location for ANs . Using hexagonal/triangular deployment of ANs in the deployment field the network deployment field is roughly divided into hexagonal/triangular field using multiple transmission power levels of ANs . As shown in the Fig. 1 
IV. LOCK

A. Underlying Approach
In existing key pre-distribution schemes, two communicating sensors either use one or some of their shared pre-loaded keys directly as their communication key [15] [9] , or compose a pairwise key by their preloaded secret shares. Although this kind of mechanism has low computational overhead, it could lead to a serious security threat in practice. If some SNs are captured after the deployment, an adversary may crack some or even all the communication keys in the network by those compromised keys or secret shares. This node capture attack is the main threat to a key pre-distribution scheme. To address the limitations of existing key pre-distribution schemes, we propose to incorporate the location dependence with pre-distribution. Our proposal allows each pair of neighboring SNs has a unique pairwise key between them, which cannot be derived from the preoladed setup keys by other nodes. An adversary cannot crack the pairwise keys among non-captured SNs , even if some SNs are captured and their stored key information is compromised. Therefore, any SNs compromise can not affect the communication between noncompromised SNs .
B. Procedures in LOCK
Our proposed LOCK scheme has two phases, (a) Setup keys assignment phase, (b) Location dependent Keys Generation Phase Key generation phase includes the generation of group, cluster and pair wise key between nodes. An off-line authority center called SINK is in charge of the initialization of the SNs in LOCK. Before deployment, each sensor node is assigned a unique ID ; generated by SINK . Besides this each sensor node is also assigned the IDs of two CH which is assigned the part of the information required to generate pair wise key with its post deployment CH . SINK also generates a large size key pool P composed of more than 20 2 distinct symmetric keys. For each sensor node i SN , SINK randomly selects a secret key from P and stores it into i SN s memory, this pre-loaded key is denoted as
is the shared pairwise key between node i SN and the Sink node, and is be used to encrypt the exchanged data between the node i SN and SINK .
Setup Key Assignment Phase: Before SNs are deployed, setup keys need to be pre-loaded into them in a certain way to ensure any two nodes can find some common keys after the deployment. Besides this each sensor node is also assigned IDs of two CH which is assigned the part of the information required to generate pair wise key with its post deployment CH . For each i SN , SINK randomly selects some keys from P and pre-loads them into the intended s SN ' memory. In our scheme, this pre-loaded information is named as network setup keys. Besides these a common key K is preloaded as a common setup key into the memory of each SN . To ensure any two SNs share some keys after deployment, depending upon its location beside common key K , we use a simple but efficient setup key assignment method for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks( HWSN ).
Suppose there are n SNs in the network. First, SINK randomly selects n distinct keys from key pool P and constructs a two-dimensional (m×m) matrix M , where numbers, assigned to SNs by their post deployment CH (Deployment of CHs is discussed in previous section). Before we can generate the complete rows of the matrix we need to customize the key matrix with respect to s SN ' Location. To customize and to make the scheme location dependent, the diagonal elements of a SN in a cluster in conformance to its administered cluster and corresponding geographical location; CHs computes the common content of the broadcast received by all constituent cells and sends the common broadcast vector to each node in its cluster using a plain broadcast message or by encrypting using cluster key.
Equation (1) ( )
Now each node is provided with localized keys which represent the diagonal elements of the Key Matrix K . Next we propose to use Dual Skewed Hash Binary Tree (DHBT)where left or right branch can be generated using hash of left shifted value or right shifted value. The diagonal elements are considered as roots of these DHBT. values in the storage [10] . This is where our scheme performs better in terms of memory requirements as it requires only m keys in the memory. For higher values of t this saving in memory requirements are even higher. For higher values of t this memory requirement shoots up exponentially [10] and thus our scheme offers a memory efficient approach for establishing pair wise keys in HWSNs. Any two SNs share at least 2 2t common keys in their memories, therefore, our setup key assignment which is deployment knowledge independent but location dependent in manner compared to procedure in [10] but still guarantee the connectivity between any two nodes in the network. Compared to scheme proposed in [6] our scheme ensures 100 percent connectivity among nodes of WSN. So, compared with existing key pre-distribution schemes, our approach is the first one to support full network connectivity without any prior deployment information and no matter how the SN are deployed and offers higher memory efficiency and computational efficiency, which are the main contribution of our proposed scheme. ( ) 
Key Generation
"⊕ is the exclusive-or operator, In LOCK, each SN stores m diagonal keys from the constructed matrix M and t rows and t column indexes. Since each pair of row and column has an intersection entry between them, any two SNs can find 2 2t common keys after they exchange the handshaking messages, which means, any two SNs which are members of same cluster, within their radio transmission range, can directly setup a secure link without the third node's participation.
In other words, the path-key establishment phase of existing key pre-distribution schemes is eliminated in our approach, which not only reduces the communication overhead, but also increases the security level of the generated pairwise keys. On the other hand, since each generated pairwise key is distinct to others, LOCK improves the network resilience against node capture attack. Further customizing the diagonal elements to a cluster results in strengthening the resilience against node capture attack as same node may never be used outside the cluster heads transmission range.
Geographical 
where " ... as K will be deleted after bootstrapping is over.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We analyze the security property and evaluate the performance of our proposed LOCK scheme in this section.
A.. Security Analysis
Node Replication Attack: Because of the unattended mode operation, some SNs could be physically captured by an adversary during the operating period. Thus Node replication attack is a severe threat for WSNs due to its infrastructure less architecture. In [9] , the pair-wise keys are directly used from the pre-loaded keys. After the network bootstrapping phase, if SN is captured and all its stored keys are compromised, the adversary can duplicate some malicious node and deploy them into the network to execute some attacks such as eavesdropping, Denial-ofService (DoS), etc.
In LOCK the keys are not same throughout the operational life of the SN . Cluster key is updated as and when needed using most recent broadcast from the ANs. Geographical group key is updated using new and remaining list of nodes from cluster head and new broadcast from the ANs . Diagonal entries of the matrix got customized with respect to the corresponding cluster using the common part of the broadcast received by the nodes in the cluster head's coverage range. Moreover any pair of SNs has a unique pairwise key between them after network initialization phase, which can be used to authenticate the communicating parties mutually. Without the proper authentication, any stranger's packets will just be ignored. Consequently node replication attack can be totally prevented by our proposed scheme.
Resiliency against Node Capture Attack: Adversary can physically capture some SNs to compromise the secret information. Node capture attack is the most serious threat in WSNs.
The communication between non-captured nodes could be cracked even they are not physically captured. In [15] , if each SN stores 200 keys in its memory and the probability that any two nodes share at least one common key is 0.33 and 50 nodes' capture could compromise 10% of the communication among the non-captured nodes. Although [9] claims that the network resilience can be improved if two nodes share at least ( ) l> common keys to establish a secure link, it only works when the number of captured nodes is less than a critical value. When the number of captured nodes exceeds the critical value, the fraction of compromised communication among non-captured nodes increases even at a much faster rate than [15] . In LOCK, after the pairwise key generation phase, each pair of neighboring nodes have a unique pairwise key between them, hence any node's capture can not affect the secure communication between non-captured nodes. In other words, our approach can guarantee the communication security among noncaptured nodes no matter how many SNs are captured by the adversary, which is one of the main contributions of our work. Fig.5 shows that above 30% of the communication between non-captured nodes are compromised in [9] when 200 nodes are captured; if the number of captured nodes increases to 500, more than 60% of the communication of the rest network will be compromised. On the contrary, no communication between non-captured nodes could be compromised in LOCK no matter how many SNs are captured by the adversary. Fig. 6 shows the LOCK cluster size supported.
assorted. As a result of location dependence the network size supported is much larger than any existing key management scheme.
If we assume the number of clusters is 7 and the size of the network is almost 7 times of cluster, the network supported is drawn in Fig. 6 . In LOCK, the maximum supported cluster size exponentially increases when the key ring size increases linearly, which means our proposed scheme has better scalability than any of the existing key pre-distribution schemes till date. Think of the network size that can be supported in our deployment. Random key pre-distribution key management scheme can support a network of size 200 nodes using 50 keys per node. Q-composite [4] key distribution is not much better than Random key pre-distribution key management scheme.
In LOCK the same matrix got localized and thus same equation which earlier denoted the size of equation which earlier denoted the size of the network, exploits the size of cluster. Moreover due to our proposal of storing only diagonal entries the memory requirements are even lesser. Network Connectivity: Random key predistribution schemes cannot guarantee any two SNs establish a pairwise key directly. To increase the network connectivity, intermediate nodes need to be involved in a path-key establishment procedure. Even so, based on probability theory, some SNs or some portions of a network are still possibly isolated from the network if no path-keys can be established.
LOCK can guarantee a completed network connectivity since any two SNs can find common setup keys between them, which is the second contribution of our work. Fig. 7 shows that LOCK can generate a connected network with only one-hop neighbors' information exchange. For random key pre-distribution schemes, two or three more hops neighbors need to be involved to setup an almost connected network, which not only reduce the security of the established pairwise key, but also produce more communication overhead in the network.
Communication Overhead: In random key predistribution schemes, each SN exchanges all of its stored key information with its neighbors. For a large-scale communication and memory storage overheads are produced in this procedure. LOCK guarantees any two nodes to establish a pairwise key directly; therefore, its communication overhead is much lower than the previous schemes.
C. Performance reviewed in the light of multiple Transmission levels of Anchor Nodes
Scheme proposed in previous sections has support for all three types of keys namely cluster key, Pair wise key and group key. Key refresh mechanism of cluster and pair wise keys is achieved with the help of periodic or event based broadcast from ANs. The information broadcast used by nodes in a cluster to generate cluster and pairwise keys. To measure the effect of number of power levels and radius of broadcast we reinvestigate the performance 
Number of Hops Connectivity ratio with Same
Cluster Neighbors LOCK Random Key PreDistribution(k=50) Figure 7 : Network Connectivity vs. Number of hops needed for pair wise keys and subject to various configuration and analyze the effect on memory and connectivity performance. We start by investigating the expected number of keys stored on each sensor node when using LOCK. This gives a measure of memory capacity of every sensor that needs to be devoted for LOCK while refreshing.
Location Dependence measurements:
The number of keys stored on a sensor node is only momentarily contributed by the number of messages that a node receives from various ANs and almost completely by number of generation keys stored on each sensor node. Starting with memory required by the former factor. Each message contains a nonce which is then used to form or customize the pre-distributed keys with respect to its location in the deployment field and to derive a key used for geographical group and to derive a cluster key. After these uses the nonce obtained by the nodes are deleted.
Hence we need to store these keys momentarily and delete thereafter. Thus there is not major consumption on the memory of the individual nodes as a result of receiving broadcast from ANs . If we assume the memory consumption is contributed equally by former factor, then we need to determine the expected number of messages received by a sensor node. In order to this we divide the messages transmitted by each AN into P N different categories, where P N is the number of power levels on 
The equation (8) R we are able to cover more nodes by the same AN and thus the probability of having same diagonal contents shared among neighbors increases and thus lowers Location dependence. We can achieve desired connectivity but compromise ratio will have a boost as a result. To achieve connectivity ratio of 1 and low compromise ratio we are required to increase the size of matrix to achieve desired uniqueness in row and column assignment. The memory requirement is dependent upon number of power levels. The reason to this issue is attributed to the behavior is that with even single power level the node in coverage of AN will receive one nonce/subkey. The predistributed contents and thereafter customized contents are same throughout and thus will require a large sized matrix and thus higher memory requirement at each SN to achieve desired connectivity at low compromise ratio.
With only one power level impact of compromised nodes is very severe. To avoid the effect on the compromise ratio we need to increase the size of matrix and thus memory requirement at each SN .
To achieve the uniqueness in pre distributed information we need extremely large sized key matrix. Thus memory requirement is heavenly dependent upon the number of power levels. This is because when using a single power level any node in the transmission range of an AN knows the of all secrets transmitted by the AN . When the number of power levels increases for the same value of C N R , the number of secrets of ANs known by the sensor node depends upon the distance of the sensor from ANs of interest.
Consider the case where all the intermediate power levels are eliminated. Then sensor in any region will receive all the secrets from all the transmitting anchor nodes. Thus compromise of any node in the region will jeopardize the communication of any other sensor node in the network unless we increase the matrix size. On the other hand by having three power levels for each AN , the nodes in any region will not receive all the secrets from AN . In such a case compromise of a node leads to a lesser number of secure links between non-compromised nodes being jeopardized. This effect is attributed to the fact that with the increase in the number of power levels the degree of location dependence increases thus causing a reduction in number of SN in each cell and thus in a cluster. This will reduce the size of matrix by many folds equivalent to the number of clusters obtained as a result of sectoring of network deployment field. This factor will continue to affect the memory requirement; in other words lower down the memory requirement unless each node in a separate cell. We can increase the number levels to a degree such that there should be at least two nodes in each cell. Even at high degree of location dependence the connectivity ratio is 1 for every node in the same cluster. Beyond a threshold i.e each SN in a separate cell, this factor will not affect / have impact on the compromise ratio but reduces the connectivity ratio to 0. Thus the compromise ratio as well as connectivity ratio is sensitive only to very low and very high values of P N . To study the effects of density, number of power levels and transmission levels of AN on the compromise ratio. For a sensor node we consider only the density and maximum transmission range.
For a sensor node connectivity remains same and compromise ratio increase as the density of sensor is increased. This is because with the increase in sensor density there are more nodes that share the same customized diagonal entries. As more nodes are close by and thus able to connect with their neighbors, a node is able to set up secure links with more of its neighbors. In addition compromise of a node is still unaffected as long as we able to have uniqueness in row and column assignment. With the increase in the density the size of matrix may required be increased to bring uniqueness in row and column assignment and thus increasing the memory requirement at each node.
Further as the transmission radius of the sensor nodes is increased, the nodes have more neighbors and a node is able to communicate with a node only if they share commonly customized matrix. Moreover if node belongs to the neighboring cluster node will not be able to communicate. We have not considered such scenario, but of course will reduce linked node compared to potential neighboring nodes. The connectivity ratio on the other hand could be reduced. Increasing radius results in increasing the neighbors; some of which might not be sharing the same secrets; as new neighbors might not be covered by the same ANs as node concerned. Thus reducing the capacity of connecting to all the neighbors of a sensor node thus reducing connectivity ratio.
The compromise ratio on the other hand should not be affected. Changing the transmission range will not affect the number of non compromised nodes impacted due to compromise of any node. It is because a noncompromised node is impacted only when it shares keys with the compromised nodes. And sharing of keys is not governed by the transmission range of a sensor node. Increasing the transmission range might allow more number of non-compromised nodes to set up secure links and the fraction of these new links that are impacted cannot be predicted.
Increasing the number of power levels R has positive impact on both the connectivity ratio or compromise ratio. This is because by increasing the number of ANs more number of Sensor Nodes can receive the beacons/nonces which allow them to derive their own customized diagonals. This also has a positive impact on the compromise ratio by reducing the compromise ratio since location dependence increases with increase in the density of ANs . Increasing the maximum transmission radius of a ANs has negative impact on Location dependence. This is because by increasing the P N R more number of sensor nodes will receive beacons from the same AN . This makes it easier for neighboring nodes to share common diagonal. This will also result in increasing compromise ratio. Thus from above we can conclude that the AN density has to increased while ensuring that both are not large in order to reduce the impact of compromised nodes. But this could increase the cost associated with the deployment. If compromise of nodes can be tolerated then the system can deploy a low density of ANs with large transmission range and fewer power levels.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
With the proposal above we are able to highlight the effect of Heterogeneity on the performance of Key Management Scheme in Wireless Sensor Networks. We considered a special kind of heterogeneity i.e. Number of Power levels and were able to draw the effect on performance in terms of memory requirements and size of the network supported by LOCK. Average number of nuances/keys received depend not only the maximum transmission radius but also on number of power levels. Although some issues like simulation results etc still needs be addressed but hopefully in our next work we come out with better results on the issue. Future scope lies in making this scheme scalable with respect to new node addition , routing aware and thus achieve secure communication. We have not considered much of intercluster communication model among the Sensor nodes thus open challenge.
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